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PREFACE 
This is the first technical report to be produced from an extensive examination of the 
isolation of the RF-Distribution (RFD) System of a CDAA site from site-generated conducted 
EMI. The work was done by a special Signal-to-Noise Enhancement Program (SNEP) team at 
the Wahiawa CDAA site operated by the Naval Security Group Department, Honolulu, Hawaii. 
Technical and administrative support was provided by NRaD Activity Pacific. The impetus for 
the work came from the observation of a large number of instances of site-generated interference 
leaking into RF paths and appearing as harmful levels of radio interference at the input to 
receivers. 
Test signals were injected onto the shields of cables, ground conductors and power 
conductors, and the leakage of the test signals into signal paths to receiving systems was 
explored. The maximum tolerable level of current injected into these conductors to avoid 
h d l  interference at the input to receivers was then determined. The levels of EMI current 
normally found on the conductors of today's receiving sites are often considerably higher than 
the tolerable levels. 
Two solutions to the problem are identified. They are (1) the careful design and 
implementation of RFD systems to provide the greatest possible isolation from harmful levels of 
EMI current, and (2) the reduction of the present harmful levels of EMI current to harmless 
levels. A third, often proposed solution-better equipment and system grounding-is not an 
effective solution. 
The authors of this report are especially grateful for the excellent assistance of all team 
members. Personnel of NRaD Activity Pacific and the staff of NSGD Honolulu were especially 
helpful in implementing this effort. Both organizations assisted in key aspects of the work, and 
they were essential to obtain the data used to produce this report. The findings of the effort have 
uncovered several problems in the design and construction techniques used in present-day 
receiving sites which need attention. The findings identify a key reason for the decline in the 
signal-intercept productivity of many of our receiving sites. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
A Signal-to-Noise-Enhancement Program (SNEP) Team visited NSGD Honolulu in 
August 1996. A primary purpose of the visit was to investigate the leakage of site-generated 
electromagnetic interference into the RF paths of the radio-frequency-distribution system (RFD). 
SNEP-team visits to other sites had revealed that site-generated EMI was sometimes present at 
the input terminals of receiving systems; however there is never sufficient time during a standard 
SNEP-team survey of a site to fully investigate the problem. Since external radio interference 
(usually power-line noise) was usually higher in magnitude than internally-generated EM, a 
detailed investigation of the internal problem was delayed until a time and opportunity occurred 
to investigate the matter. 
The external radio-interference problem at some receiving sites has now been reduced to 
manageable levels, and ongoing work on this problem is being pursued at other sites. A 
handbook’ describing effective techniques to mitigate external radio interference from power 
lines has been completed. The procedures in this handbook, when strictly followed, significantly 
reduce the radio-interference level at the input to a site’s receivers; in addition they often uncover 
lower levels of interference from internal sources of EMI. Internal EMI recently has been 
identified as the primary problem at some sites2. These findings place emphasis on an 
investigation of the extent of the internal EMI problem and on quantifying the leakage of EMI 
into the RF paths of the RFD. The CDAA site at NSGD Honolulu, Hawaii (located near the city 
of W&awa) was available for such a test. This particular site is supported by NRaD Activity 
Pacific, a key participant in SNEP team activities. Their personnel have a detailed knowledge of 
the site. Also, special instrumentation could be shipped to the NRaD Activity Pacific facility for 
storage and final tests prior to transportation to the CDAA site. 
SNEP-team personnel participating in the test are listed in Appendix A. 
* 
Mitigation Handbook, 3rd Edition, prepared for COMNAVSECGRU, N-44, March 1996. 
Commander. COMNAVSECGRU, N-44, September 1996. 
Wilbur R. Vincent and George F. Munsch, Signal-to-Noise-Enhancement Program Power-Line Noise 
GUA9609 SNEP Team, WI/EAd Survey, NSGA Guantanamo Bay, Quick-Look Report, prepared for 
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2. BACKGROUND COMMENTS 
Digital equipment and power-control systems have been introduced into receiving and 
data-processing sites with little regard for their potential impact on the primary mission of the 
sites. Many such systems inject significant levels of EMI current onto the grounds, cable 
shields, power conductors, conduits, air-conditioning ducts, pipes, and other conducting material 
in a site. This document explores the extent of the leakage of site-generated EMI into the RF 
paths. It also investigates the maximum tolerable levels of EMI current on a site's conductors 
from internal sources. 
Figure 2-1 (910129 0929) shows an example of the harmful impact of site-generated 
EMI on the operation of a receiving system at a CDAA site. The EMI current flowing on the 
shield of the antenna cable to WARS is shown in the top amplitude-vs.-frequency view. A peak 
in the current (about 800 FA) was noted at 5.1 M H Z .  The middle amplitude-vs.-frequency view 
shows the EMI leakage into RFD Beam A-300. The leakage amplitude is about -105 dBm in a 
300-Hz measurement bandwidth. This is about the average amplitude of SO1 received by the 
antenna system. The time-history view shows the similar temporal structure of the EMI current 
and the EMI leakage into the RF path for Beam A-300. 
The source of the EMI in Figure 2-1 was traced to a mid-sized computer located in 
another part of the facility. The shields of LAN cables, the shields of other conductors, and 
grounds running from this computer to other locations in the Operations building carried very 
high levels of EMI current. 
paths spread the EMI onto other cables, throughout the site, and into the low-level RF paths. 
Direct-conducting, inductive-coupling, and capacitive-coupling 
Figure 2-2 (920812 1545) shows the impact of site-generated EMI on a small receiving 
site. The top amplitude-vs:-frequency view shows the ambient signals and the noise floor fed to 
a receiver over the frequency range of 15.5 to 31.5 MHz.  Excessive noise was traced to a 
standard IBM-compatible desktop computer operating in the site. The middle 
amplitude-vs.-frequency view shows the ambient signals and the noise floor when the computer 
was turned off. The time-history view shows the change in the noise floor when the computer 
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Figure 2-1 
Example of the Adverse Impact of Site-Generated EM1 
on Signal Reception at a Large Site 
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Example of the Adverse Impact of Site-Generated EMI 
on Signal Reception at a Small Site 
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The source of the computer-generated E M  in Figure 2-2 was traced to radiation from a 
modem cable running from the computer to a telephone jack. When this cable was disconnected 
from the computer, site-generated EMI was not detectable at the receiver input. Direct radiation 
from the computer did not affect the noise floor or the operation of the site. 
* 
A third example is provided to show that the internal E M  problem also extends upward 
into the VHF and UHF bands. Figure 2-3 (960924 0945) shows E M  at the input terminals of a 
receiver in the upper part of the VHF band. Bands of E M  are spaced about 1.6-MHz apart 
across the entire width of the frequency range examined. Excessive levels of E M  were found 
from the lower end of the HF band upward into the UHF band. The source was traced to the 
synchronizer unit of the site's video security system (VSS). 
One aspect of the VSS example should be noted. Due to the lugh signal environment, a 
preamplifier could not be used to lower the noise figure of the measurement system to that of the 
receiving system. The noise floor of Figure 2-3 is more than 20-dB higher than the receiving 
system. Thus the impact of the EMI on the receiving system is much greater than implied by a 
casual glance at the measured data. 
The three examples showing the impact of internally-generated E M  on the reception of 
radio signals are typical of numerous other examples obtained at both small and large receiving 
sites. While a collection of such examples has accumulated over several years of measurements 
at receiving sites, a comprehensive examination of the overall problem was not made until the 
tests at NSGD Honolulu. External E M  from sources on power lines was an even larger 
problem, and most of the SNEP-team resources were directed at the larger problem. 
Nevertheless, the presence of many examples of the detrimental impact of internal EMI on 
signal reception lying in the files reminded team members that this next-larger problem needed 
attention. The injection tests at Wahiawa described in this document constitute the beginning of 
the investigation of this larger problem and the start of developing effective mitigation actions. 
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Example of the Adverse Impact of Site-Generated ERII 
on Signal Reception at a VHFKJHF Site 
- 6 -  
3. IMPLEMENTATION 
3.1 Instrumentation 
The instrumentation required to inject known levels of current into grounds, cable 
shields, conduits and other conductors was assembled and tested at the Naval Postgraduate 
School. It was then packed and shipped to NRaD Activity Pacific. The new facility of NRaD 
Pacific was efficiently designed for the convenient receipt and storage of instrumentation and for 
the checkout of equipment. NRaD also provided additional instrumentation and personnel to aid 
in the conduct of the tests. An NRaD van was used to transport the instrumentation to the 
NSGD Honolulu site. 
Figure 3.1 - 1 is a block diagram of the injection equipment. 
IMPEDANCE I I I F i i i F N  I 1- MATCHBOX SIGNAL I SOURCE 
Figure 3.1-1 
Injection Instrumentation 
The upper row of Figure 3.1-1 shows the injection instrumentation. The signal source 
was a Kenwood Model TS-50 Transceiver which had been modified to generate a signal at any 
desired frequency between 2 and 30 MHz.  Power output could be varied from very low levels 
up to a maximum of 100 watts for short periods of time. Several models of impedance match 
boxes were used to match the 50-ohm output of the TS-50 unit to the injection probe. Standard 
amateur radio match boxes were used. Since the driving impedance of the injection conductor 
was reflected back into the signal source, it was necessary to cope with a wide range of driving 
impedance values. The injection probe contained taps on its winding to aid in impedance 
matching. It was a custom made probe designed for the injection of HF current into conductors. 
-7- 
The second row of instrumentation in Figure 3 . 1  - 1 provided a means to measure the level 
of the injection current. A Fischer Model F-70 Current Probe was used as a current sensor and a 
standard spectrum analyzer was used to measure the amplitude of the current. The TS-50 power 
output and the match box were adjusted to obtain a desired level of injection current. 
Figure 3.1-2 shows the instrumentation used to measure the amplitude of the test signal 
appearing at an output port of the RFD. The RFD output port for the test receiver located in the 
RF Room was used. The amplitude at the input of the site receivers would be about 1 or 2 dB 
less than the recorded data because of the added attenuation of the cable running from the output 
port of the RFD. This loss was ignored for the purposes of this measurement. 
. . 
RFD OUTPUT PORT 
Figure 3.1-2 
Signal Leakage Measurement Instrumentation 
The signal measurement instrumentation was very simple. It consisted of set of bandpass 
filters to limit the total signal power into the instrumentation, a preamplifier assembly with a 
gain of 20 dB, and a spectrum analyzer for signal-level measurements. A standard SNEP 
preamplifier assembly was used to obtain a signal-measurement sensitivity near that of a 
standard HF receiver. The goal was to be able to detect a signal level as low as -130 dBm in a 
3-kHz gaussian-shaped bandwidth. Hewlett Packard Series HP-141 and Model 8560 Spectrum 
Analyzers were used to measure leakage signal levels. Both models of analyzers provided 
consistent, reliable, and repeatable amplitude measurements. 
The instrumentation permitted the measurement of leakage signals along with ambient 
signals and noise from the antenna. The test frequency was varied up or down a few kilohertz to 
avoid strong signals. Alternatively, the input to the primary multicouplers could be terminated 
to remove ambient signals and external noise. Most measurements were made with the antenna 
connected in order to provide realistic information involving all possible RFD leakage 
mechanisms. 
-8- 
3.2 EMI Leakage, Initial Test 
An initial test of leakage was made prior to starting the measurements for a series 
identified as Tests 1 through 5 .  The initial test was made to check the operation of the injection 
and measurement instrumentation, and to become acquainted with the extent, if any, of leakage 
from the test point into the RF paths. The results of the complete test series are described later 
in this section. For this initial test a discrete-frequency E M  signal was injected onto the shield 
of the coaxial cable running from the ground floor RF Room to the WARS located in an 
operational area on the second floor. The test configuration is described more completely in 
Section 3.3 (see Test 1). 






EM1 Level at Enlarger Output Port I Injection on WARS Antenna cable 
0 
0 24 48 72 96 120 144 168 192 216 240 264 288 312 336 
BEAM 
Figure 3.2-1 
EMI Leakage from Initial Test 
Leakage into the RF path provided for the test receiver in the RF Room is shown. The 
amplitude of the leakage signal is provided in dB above the receiver noise floor when the noise 
floor is measured in a 3-kHz gaussian shaped bandwidth. The actual leakage level can be 
reconverted into dBm by subtracting 130 from each value shown in the figure. 
-9- 
One primary aspect of the data is evident from a cursory examination of the example. 
Excessive test-signal leakage was found for Beams LBM-288 and LBM-3 12. Leakage for these 
two beams was 15-dB higher than that of all other beams. This leakage was quickly traced by 
NRaD personnel to faulty coaxial connectors in RF paths for the two beams. The connectors 
were repaired before starting the sequence of measurements described in Sections 3.3 through 
3.7. The example is shown to demonstrate the destructive impact on signal reception from 
improperly assembled and defective coaxial cables and connectors in the RFD. EMI current will 
efficiently seek such weak spots in the RFD and appear as harmful and destructive interference 
at the input terminals of a receiver. 
A second factor of high interest is also shown in Figure 3.2-1. The injection current of 
707 pA (a value of EMI current often found on the WARS RF cable at CDAA sites) produces 
interference levels about 30-dB above the noise floor in the RF path feeding the test receiver in 
the RF Room. This is a very high level of interference. It indicates that the W paths are poorly 
isolated from site-generated EMI current flowing on the WARS antenna cable and probably 
from site-generated EMI current flowing on other conductors. 
One can assume that if the EMI current is reduced in level by 30 dB, the interference 
level should be reduced to the noise floor. This suggests that the maximum EMI current that can 
be tolerated is about 22.4 PA. This is much lower than the EMI current levels found on the 
WARS antenna cable in most sites and lower than the E M  current levels found on many other 
conductors in a receiving site. 
This initial measurement provided useful guidance for the conduct of the more 
comprehensive test series. 
The implications of the leakage results are more completely discussed ;n Section 4. 
-10- 
3.3 EMI Leakage, Test 1 
Figure 3.3-1 provides a sketch of the layout of Test 1. EMI current at a preset level was 
injected onto the shield of the double-shielded coaxial cable leading from the RF Room to 
WARS. The WARS system was provided with signals from a distribution plate inside Bay 4 of 
the RF Room rather than from an output port of ENLARGER. EMI leakage into the RFD was 
then examined at the output port of ENLARGER serving the test receiver position in the RF 
Room. A Fischer Model F-70 probe and a spectrum analyzer were used to set the injection 
current to a prescribed level. 
I RF DISTRIBUTION 
PLATE INSIDE OF 
ROW21BAY4IN 
o THERFROOM 







I I SPECTRUM ANALYZER 
WAH9Ei37l7-10 
Figure 3.3-1 
Block Diagram for Test 1 
The test signal was set on a preset frequency and amplitude, the spectrum analyzer was 
tuned to the test frequency, and the ENLARGER azimuth control was sequentially stepped 
through all beams. The leakage signal level was measured for all beams. This process was 
-11- 
. __ 
repeated at 1-MHz intervals over the frequency range of 2 to 30  MHz. For this test, the injection 
current was adjusted to 707 PA, an EMI level often found on FW cable shields in CDAA sites. 
Figure 3.3-2 shows the leakage signal for six frequencies in the low-band. Signal 
amplitude is shown on the Y-axis, beam heading on the X-axis, and frequency on the Z-axis 
The leakage values are expressed in dB above the RFD noise floor of -130 dBm (the 
approximate noise floor of a primary multicoupler for a 3-kHz gaussian-shaped bandwidth) 
Note that Beams 288 and 312 have somewhat higher leakage than most other beams The EMI 
leakage varied from about 20- to a peak value of 69-dB above the noise floor, implying a 
maximum tolerable EMI level of 0.25  PA. 
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Azimuth 
Injection Test 960710 
Inject into WARS Antenna Cable Shield in RFD 
Injection Level 707 PA 
Level in dB above -130 at ENLARGER Output Port 
Figure 3.3-2 
Low-Band E M  Leakage, Test 1 
Figure 3.3-3  shows leakage into the RFD from EMI current flowing on the shield of the 
WARS coaxial cable for 20 frequencies in the high band. Leakage is shown for each test 
frequency and for all CDAA beams. The high-band leakage was considerably more uniform 
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than for the low-band. No major resonance effects were noted. The leakage signal varied from 
40- to a peak of 68-dB above the noise floor. The maximum EMI leakage current that can be 
tolerated on the shield of the WARS antenna cable without interference to low-level signals of 
interest (SOI) would be 68-dB below the injection current. This yields a maximum tolerable 
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24 72 120 168 216 264 312 Inject into WARS Antenna Cable Shield 
Azimuth Injection lwei 707uA 
Signal above -130 dBrn at ENLARGER Output 
I File SIG0710b PRE 
Figure 3.3-3 
High-Band EMI Leakage, Test 1 
The maximum tolerable injection current is somewhat less than the previously suggested 
maximum level3 of 2 pA for EMI current on cable shields, grounds, and other conductors. It is 
also considerably lower than EMI current levels commonly found in receiving sites. Even 
greater protection would be required for the detection of spread-spectrum signals received, at 
amplitudes below a 0-dB (S+N)/N threshold level. 
Wilbur R. Vincent and Richard W. Adler, The Control oflntra-Site Sources of RFI/Eh4I at Naval Receiving 
Sites, Technical Memorandum WV9404 1 1, November 1994. 
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RFSM RFSM BITE MULTI- 
CONTROL COUPLER 
3.4 EMI Leakage Test 2 
Figure 3.4-1 shows the measurement configuration for Test 2. The instrumentation was 
similar to that in the previous test, but the injection probe was moved to the ground bus running 
under the ENLARGER bays. The ENLARGER bays and other RFD system components were 
grounded to this bus. The bus was electrically connected to other building ground buses and 
eventually to an earth ground located several hundred feet from the injection location 
BAY 9 BAY 8 BAY 7 
DF MATRIX RF MATRIX RF MATRIX 
I I I I I 1 
LlQUA-TITE CONDUIT 
FEEDING M Y  8 INJECTION PROBE- 
I INJECTION EQUIPMENT I ANALYZER 
Figure 3.4-1 
Block Diagram for Test 2 
The injection and measurement process for Test 2 was identical to that for Test 1.  The 
injection level, 707 PA, was the same as for Test 1. 
Figure 3.4-2 shows the E M  leakage levels for beams in the low band. Seven test 
frequencies spaced I-MHz apart were used. The result at 8.01 M H z  is repeated in the high-band 
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Low-Band EMI Leakage, Test 2 
EMI leakage could be measured on only three .low-band beams at 2.01 M H z  and only 
eight beams at 4.01 MHz. Leakage was somewhat easier to measure at the higher frequencies. 
Large variations in leakage signal level were found, indicating that the leakage paths contained 
large resonances. This is a reasonable conclusion since sections of ground bus lengths and other 
conductor lengths were at resonant lengths for the higher frequencies. The maximum leakage 
level at the low-band was 55-dB above the system noise floor. This suggests that the maximum 
tolerable EMI current on the ground bus (for a 0-dB (S+N)/N ratio) would be about 1.3 FA for 
the low-band frequencies. 
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Azimuth 
Figure 3.4-3 
High-Band EMI Leakage, Test 2 
The maximum high band leakage was 59 dBm. This indicates that the EMI current must 
be reduced to 0.8 pA to be at the noise level of the primary multicouplers for a 3-kHz detection 
bandwidth. 
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3.5 EMI Leakage, Test 3 
Figure 3.5-1 shows a sketch of the measurement configuration for Test 3 .  The test signal 
was injected into one of the RG-85 cables leading from the RF Room to the antenna elements. 
The injection probe was located outside the RG-85 cable termination plate. 






Block Diagram for Test 3 
The low-band injection was increased to 7070 pA to produce a useful leakage value for a 
reasonable number of the beams. The low-band results for Test 3 are shown in Figure 3.5-2. 
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Injection Level 7070 uA 
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File SIG0712A 
Figure 3.5-2 
Low-Band EMI Leakage, Test 3 
Data could not be obtained for about half the beam-frequency cases due to resonance 
effects in the cables, ground conductors, and the leakage paths. The maximum leakage level was 
26-dB above the noise floor, indicating that EM currents up to about 362 pA could be tolerated 
on the RG-85 antenna cable shield. The higher tolerable level of EMI current on the shield of 
the RG-85 cable suggests that some E M  isolation to internal RFD leakage paths is provided by 
the antenna cable termination plate. This was one of the original purposes of the termination 
plate, and it appears to have retained some of its isolation capability even though the plate is now 
located inside the expanded building 
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24 72 120 168 216 264 312 Inject into RG-85 Shield Outside Termination Plate 
Azmluth Injection Level 7070 uA 
Signal Level at ENLARGER Output in dB above -130 dBm 
File SIG0712B 
Figure 3.5-3 
High-Band E M  Leakage, Test 3 
While more data slots were filled for high-band Test 3, the end result was about the same 
as for the low-band. The maximum leakage level was 43-dB above the noise floor. This 
indicates that EMI current levels of 50.1 pA can be tolerated on the shield of'this cable over the 
total frequency range of the high band. This indicates that the RG-85 antenna coaxial cable was 
reasonably well isolated from leakage paths in the RFD. 
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3.6 EMI Leakage, Test 4 
For Test 4 the injection probe was moved to the shield of the RF cable for antenna 
element LB-16 located inside the antenna cable barrier plate. Figure 3.6-1 shows the test 
configuration. The injection level remained at 7070 FA. 
ANTENNA CABLE BARRIER PLATE 
INSIDE OF RF ROOM 
1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  
LO 16 LO 20 










Block Diagram for Test 4 
Figure 3.6-2 shows h e  result of the low-band measurements. Data' were obtained on 
most of the beam-frequency slots. Of interest is that six beams from 1 0 8 O  to 168O appear to 
have less E M  isolation than the remaining beams. The maximum level of EMI coupled into the 
RFD occurred for these beams, and it was 44-dB above the noise floor. This indicates that a 
maximum level of E M  current of about 44.6 pA can be tolerated for a 0-dB (S+N)/N detection 
level at the low-band frequencies. 
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Figure 3.6-2 
Low-Band EMI Leakage, Test 4 
Figure 3.6-3 shows the high-band data for Test 4. The injection current level remained at 
7070 PA for the high-band measurements. 
The high-band data show a maximum EMI leakage level 38-dB above the noise floor. 
This indicates that the maximum EMI current allowable on the shield of the coaxial cable 
running from the termination plate to the primary multicouplers is 89 PA. The high-band 
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Injection Test 960712D 
0 48 96 144 192 240 288 336 
24 72 120 168 216 264 312 Injection into LO-16 Cable Shield inside Termination Plate 
Azimuth Injection level 7070 uA 
Signal Level in dB above -130 dBm at Enlarger Output Port 
File SIG0712D 
High-Band EMI Leakage, Test 4 
The data from the low-band and high-band tests suggest that the cable from the 
termination plate to the primary multicouplers is reasonably well isolated from the RFD output 
ports. This suggests that the primary leakage into the RFD does not take place at or near the 
input to the primary multicouplers. When compared with the results from Test 3 (Injection 
outside the termination plate) the data suggests that the termination plate in its present 
configuration provides about 15-dB of electromagnetic isolation from the RF Room at the low 
band and slightly more for the high band. It is estimated that the original building configuration, 
where the termination plates were located on the outside walls of the building, would provide 30 
to 40 dB of E M  isolation. 
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3.7 EMI Leakage Test 5 
Test 5 investigates E M  coupling between the green-wire ground conductor located in 
Power Panel TP-003-1 and the RFD output port. Power is provided to equipment in the RF 
Room by this panel. All green wires from equipment served by this panel are joined together in 
the power panel. The injection was made at the single green-wire conductor running from the 
panel to the building neutral-ground bond. Figure 3.7-1 shows the test configuration, The 
injection current was reduced to 707 pA for this test. 
RF DISTRIBUTION 
SYSTEM . 
Y E C T I O N  PROBE 












Block Diagram for Test 5 
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Figure 3.7-2 shows the EMI leakage from the green-wire ground conductor into the RFD 
for the low band. 
.01 
0 48 96 144 192 240 288 336 
g o  
24 72 120 168 216 264 312 lnjectionTest960715 
Injection: ENLARGER Power Panel, Green-wire Gnd 
File: SIG0715A 
Azimuth Injection Level 707 uA 
Figure 3.7-2 
Low-Band E M  Leakage, Test 5 
The maximum low-band leakage was 38-dB above the noise floor. The leakage was 
fairly uniform from beam to beam on many of the test frequencies. A few significant variations 
in leakage were found at some test frequencies, indicating the presence of a few resonance 
conditions. The data suggests the maximum tolerable EMI current in the green-wire power 
conductor is about 8.9 FA for the low-band beams. 
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High-Band EMI Leakage, Test 5 
The maximum high-band leakage from the green-wire conductor in the power panel 
varied from about 20-dB to as high as 60-dB above the RFD noise floor. This suggests that the 
maximum tolerable EMI current for the high band is about 0.7 PA. It is curious that the leakage 
from the green wire into the RFD is greater for the high.band than for the low band. This is the 
opposite of the prior example. However, this finding is consistent with prior observations of 
high levels of the ENLARGER Beam-Path Verification signal (near 32 MHz) on conductors in 
its power panel. These two results suggest that some aspect of the high-band signal paths of the 
RFD lack electromagnetic isolation from the power conductors. These findings also suggest that 
the E M  leakage mechanism between the RFD and the power conductors is different from those 
associated with coaxial cable shields and grounds. It further demonstrates the need for the 
complete shielding and isolation of all RF paths. 
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4. DISCUSSION 
4.1 General Comments 
The E M  leakage tests described in previous sections were made at a typical CDAA site, 
NSGA Wahiawa. The site is considered by the team to be in good physical and electrical 
condition from the standpoint of today’s installation, maintenance, and operational practices and 
procedures. The CDAA structure is a standard ANKRD-10. The Operations Building is a 
durable concrete structure commonly employed in such sites. The equipment in the RFD portion 
of the site is considered to be in accordance with normal site complements. A standard 
ENLARGER RF switch was installed at the site for the selection of beams. All single-shielded 
coaxial cable installed in the RFD during the ENLARGER installation had been replaced with 
double-shielded coaxial cable. No attempt was made to alter or change the state of the site’s 
RFD or other system for these measurements. 
Section 2 describes a few typical cases of the impact of EMI current on the reception of 
radio signals at other receiving sites. Similar examples have been found at almost all receiving 
sites visited by the authors (a total of 41 different sites). All available information suggests that 
a common EMI problem exists in most, if not all, of our HF, VHF, and UHF receiving sites. 
The examples show that changes in site design, installation practices, and maintenance practices 
are required to avoid EMI leakage into the low-level RF paths of existing and new sites. 
Effective mitigation actions must be defined for existing HF, VHF, and UHF receiving sites if 
they are to effectively accomplish their primary mission, the reception and detection of SOI. 
When considering the leakage tests described in Section 3, it must be remembered that 
many very strong signals of little or no interest are intercepted by our receiving sites. The often 
quoted saying “we are alreaa receiving far too many signals and thus can afsord to lose a few” 
is partly true, but it must be placed in proper context. The total number of signals received at 
any intercept site includes a massive number of strong signals that are of absolutely no interest. 
There is no practical way of limiting the number of the strong signals except by the use of filters, 
but filters limit the frequency coverage of the sites, Most of the signals of high interest are very 
low in amplitude, and they must be sorted from the much larger population of strong signals. 
This requires that all components in the RFD, especially preamplifiers, have sufficient dynamic 
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range to handle the total signal population collected over a desired frequency range. Eliminating 
the strong signals by attenuation, and other actions such as employing low-dynamic range 
preamplifiers, allowing site-generated EMI to seep into the RFD, and the use of RF components 
with limited shielding, simply blind the sites by preventing them from detecting the low-level 
signals of highest interest. 
Some care is required in the interpretation of the results of the EMI leakage tests 
described in Section 3. For example: 
The tests were made with discrete-frequency test signals. Experience has show that EMI 
on conductors in a site consists of a combination of discrete-frequency spectral 
components and wide-band impulsive components. 
While the EMI current flowing on the conductors of a site generally decreases in 
amplitude with increasing frequency, exceptions to this general case do occur. 
There are deep nulls and peaks in the spectral shape of EMI current. 
Standing waves of EMI current and voltage exist on the conductors of a site. 
Leakage paths into the RFD appear to be, and probably are, frequency sensitive. 
The combination of the two forms of EMI (discrete-frequency and impulsive), the erratic 
broadband spectral properties of EMI, and the complex nature of multiple leakage paths must all 
be considered. The complexity of the overall problem cannot be ignored. These factors 
complicate the analysis of the impact of leakage on the reception of radio signals. The 
formulation of a useful model describing the impact of EMI leakage on the operation of a 
receiving site is beyond today's system-modeling capability. 
Discrete-frequency components of EMI current can be directly scaled in amplitude, and 
they can be expressed in terms of frequency-varying values of transfer impedance. However, the 
amplitude of the wide-band impulsive-noise portion of the EMI current changes with both 
measurement system and receiver bandwidth. This introduces an additional complication in the 
interpretation of the EMI leakage. First, the bandwidth of the E M  current measurement process 
must be considered since the true peak, rms, or average amplitude values are seldom provided by 
the measurement process. An amplitude-vs.-bandwidth function for each case of impulsive E M  
must be established in order to determine its impact on the detection of signals. Fortunately, 
typical receiver bandwidths often limit the adverse impact of impulsive E M  on the 
signal-detection process of narrow-band signals. However, the signal-detection process is often 
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complicated by the limited linear operating range of most HF, VHF, and UHF receivers (20 to 
30 dB when the RF gain is set at maximum) before AGC action starts suppressing weak signals. 
Many cases have been noted where leakage E M  is sufficiently strong that it, rather than the 
desired signal, operates the AGC and establishes the sensitivity and gain of the receiver. 
4.2 Summary of Measured Leakage 
It is of value to first examine the impact of the discrete-frequency spectral components of 
E M  current on RFD leakage. Table 4.2-1 organizes the measured results in order of leakage. 
The highest leakage results are placed on the first row of the table and decreasing leakage results 
on lower rows. 
Table 4.2-1 
Summary of Tolerable Levels of Discrete-frequency EMI Current 
Injection 
Location 
I RG-85 Outside Term. Plate 
I MC Coax Inside Term. Plate 
I Pwr Panel Green Wire 
I Gnd Bus Under ENLARGER 
~ ~ 





















The values of maximum EMI current provided in Table 4.2-1 are maximum leakage 
values obtained from the data. Average, quasi-peak, or other statistical values can be derived 
from the raw data. Due to the complexity of the leakage mechanisms, the complexity of the 
spectral structure of the actual EMI source current, the frequency-varying driving impedance of 
the conductors carrying EMI current, the unknown impact of inductive and capacitive coupling 
paths, and some radiation of the E M  test signal, a more comprehensive analysis than the simple 
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process used to obtain the numbers in Table 4.2-1 seems an unnecessary exercise. The above 
numbers are sufficient to understand the full nature of the problem and its solutions. 
The E M  current limits in Table 4.2-1 show that site equipment which injects EMI 
current into the conductors of a site near RF paths is the greatest problem. This means that all 
possible means should be taken to move EM-generating devices out of the RF Room and out of 
all nearby rooms with conductors leading back to the RF Room. Physical and electrical isolation 
is a practical, although limited, mitigation action; often providing paths for the return of EMI 
current to its source before harmful levels of EMI current reach sensitive leakage points. There 
are limits to physical separation since EMI-generating equipment often cannot be moved far 
enough from RF cables and other conductors. Moving them outside an operations building and 
into nearby buildings raises the issue of direct radiation into a site's antennas. 
The EMI current limits in Table 4.2-1 also show that EMI current introduced into 
external cable shields (e.g., antenna cables, communications cables, telephone cables, etc.) can 
be partly isolated from the interior of a building with a simple grounded barrier plate located at 
the external surface of a building. This same practice provides isolation in the reverse direction, 
and it also provides effective lightning protection for equipment in the building. 
4.3 Transfer Impedance 
Transfer impedance, the ratio of EMI current on a conductor to RFD output voltage, is a 
useful way to describe leakage into the RFD. It is normally expressed as 
where Zt in the transfer impedance, E,,, is the EMI voltage measured at the RFD output, and I,, 
is the injection current. 
electromagnetic-isolation integrity of an RFD system. 
Transfer impedance is a valuable way to assess the general 
Values of transfer impedance can be obtained from the raw data collected for Tests 1 
through 5. The input current is provided. The values of leakage amplitude in dBm used in this 
document were obtained by measuring test-signal power in a 50-ohm load. The output voltage 
can be derived from the leakage values by converting each value into watts and then using 
Ohm's law to obtain the equivalent voltage values. 
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While the data was obtained to provide values of transfer impedance, the conversion was 
not done. This is because it was an additional step not required to obtain the desired end 
product, the maximum tolerable value of EMI current. The test was configured to directly 
obtain the desired maximum tolerable EMI current values. 
4.4 Corrective Actions 
The data in Sections 2 and 3 provide insight into the magnitude of the coupling of 
internal EMI into the signal paths of a receiving site. In most receiving sites internally- 
generated EM, leaking into the RF paths, is sufficient to cause harmful levels of radio 
interference to the reception of SOI. Yet, these levels were usually not high enough to adversely 
affect the reception of high-level signals, those of little interest. An evaluation of the impact of 
site-generated E M  must be directed at the reception of the signals of maximum interest rather 
than the high-level signals of no interest. 
The impact of site-generated EMI on the reception of SO1 can be reduced by two 
methods : 
1. Increase the isolation between low-level RF signal paths and E M  current flowing on 
the conductors of a site. 
2. Lower the E M  current on the conductors of a site to harmless levels. 
The first approach requires that all possible means be taken to isolate RF paths from EMI 
current flowing on conductors in a site. This includes the use of double-shielded coaxial cable 
for all RF paths (already accomplished at most sites), strict quality controls on the assembly of 
connectors on the coaxial cables, the use only of high-grade coax connectors, and the use of 
shielding for all components in the RFD. Recent site improvement programs have used open 
circuit-board construction in RF paths, a technique that is not tolerable in any modern receiving 
site containing digital and power-switching devices. This one aspect of most present-day 
receiving sites renders them very susceptible to EMI problems. 
The second approach requires that harmful levels of E M  current be prevented from 
flowing on cable shields, ground conductors, conduits, air-conditioning ducts, and all other 
conductors electrically connected to those listed. This can only be accomplished by the correct 
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use of electromagnetic barriers at each item of equipment that injects harmful levels of E M  
current into a site's conductors. Effective electromagnetic barriers can reduce the E M  current 
injected into the conductors of a site to harmless levels at low cost when properly done. 
Improperly done, they can be both expensive and ineffective. It is beyond the scope of this 
report to fully describe such electromagnetic barriers. 
A third approach to the control of internally-generated EMI-the better grounding of 
equipment and systems-is often suggested. This approach is not effective and will not aid in 
the control or mitigation of internally-generated E M  problems. Better site grounds often 
provide lower impedance paths for the flow of E M  current, higher levels of standing waves, and 
increased coupling into RF paths. While improved facility and earth ground systems are often 
recommended, and they are required for personnel and equipment safety reasons, they will not 
help control EMI from internal sources. 
In actual practice, a combination of the two effective control techniques listed above is 
the best approach. Care must be taken to insure the maximum possible leakage integrity of the 
RFD of all receiver sites. Equipment that injects harmful levels of EMI current into the 
conductors of a site must not be accepted, or it must first be modified to reduce the injected EMI 
current to tolerable levels. 
4.5 Other Considerations 
The introduction of EMI into low-level signal paths of the RFD from current flowing on 
cable shields, grounds, power conductors, and other conductors occurred by direct leakage into 
the site's RFD at the Wahiawa site. Direct radiation from EMI current flowing on conductors 
into the antenna has been identified at several small receiving sites. This additional mode of 
E M  is the primary problem at some small sites (e.g., Reference 2), and it has been found at 
some larger sites. Care must be taken to include direct radiation as a possible mode at all sites. 
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5. CONCLUSIONS 
The E M  leakage tests described in this document show that present site-design 
procedures, equipment-installation practices, and site-maintenance techniques result in 
unacceptable levels of radio interference from sources located within a site. There are two 
reasons for this unfortunate conclusion. 
The first reason is the relaxation of the isolation integrity of the RF paths by eliminating 
the complete shielding of all RF components. Examples of this are the open and unshielded 
circuit-boards now found in the RF paths of many sites, the use of single-shielded coaxial cable 
for RF paths, the use of improper coaxial connectors, and the use of unskilled personnel to 
assemble coaxial cables. 
The second reason is the introduction of digital equipment and power-control equipment 
into receiving sites without adequate limits on the EMI current they inject into the conductors of 
a site. Examples include the use of standard UPS systems designed only for use in commercial 
installations that can tolerate larger levels of E M  current, the use of open shields on 
communications cables, the use of insulated coaxial bulkhead connectors on digital equipment, 
and the improper connection of cable shields into the interior of digital equipment. 
This unfortunate state can be directly traced to the lack of suitable technical guidelines 
for the purchase of equipment, the installation of modern digital equipment and systems, and the 
maintenance of existing and new systems. Existing guidelines are a mixture of old material 
which is not applicable to present day receiving sites and old material that is based on solid 
technical concepts and is still useful; they generally lack the technical information needed to 
cope with the introduction of the new digital and power-control devices now available. 
Without change, this unfortunate state will continue to get worse. New digital equipment 
and new power-control equipment employ ever increasing data bandwidths, clock rates, and 
shorter switching times to provide improved operational capabilities. Means are needed to fully 
take advantage of these improvements without jeopardizing the site's mission. 
Today's EM1 problems can be corrected at low cost over time without interrupting 
It only requires that the technical information existing systems or procuring new systems. 
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